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DISPUTES AMONG PARTNERS:
PROBLEMS IN REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTIONS
OF THE U.P.A. AND THE U.L.P.A. AND
MODIFYING A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
by
LEONARD CHARLES SCHWARTZ*
The Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.)1 and the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Acts (U.L.RA.)2 contain many presumptions on the mutual rights
and duties of partners. These presumptions create many problems regard-
ing the formation and modification of partnership agreements. This ar-
ticle concerns some of the problems. Section I discusses the issue of whose
consent is necessary to rebut a presumption or modify a partnership agree-
ment. Section II discusses the issue of what evidence is sufficient to rebut
a presumption or modify a partnership agreement.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Memphis State University; J.D., Wayne State University
(1979); M.A., John Hopkins University (1970); B.A., University of Chicago (1966); Member of the
Michigan Bar.
' The Uniform Partnership Act (1914) [hereinafter U.PA.] has been adopted by every state ex-
cept Louisiana. 6 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1989).
2 The Uniform Limited Partnership Act was initially approved in 1916 and was revised in 1976
and 1985. In 1976, when the first revision was approved, the National Conference of Commissioners
of Uniform State Law treated the revision as a separate new act called "the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act." In 1985, when the second revision was initially approved, the Commissioners treated
the changes as a separate new act called "the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985)" But in 1986
the Commissioners decided to treat the revision as merely an amended version of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (1976). UNiF. Lim. PAR'rNERSHI ACT historical note, 6 U.L.A. 221 (Supp. 1989). These
changes create a problem regarding the proper title of each version and the proper form of citation.
(For an exposition of the standard rules of citation, see A UNiORM SYSTEM OF CrrATON rule 12.8.4
(14th ed. 1986).) Since the new version is not a separate new act, calling it "the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (1985)" seems inappropriate. Nonetheless, the Commissioners themselves call it
"the 1985 Act" and call the previous versions "the 1976 Act" and "the 1916 Act." UNIF. LIM. PART-
ressmtp ACT, 6 U.L.A. 220-385 (Supp. 1989). This article likewise calls the new version "the 1985
Act" [hereinafter U.L.P.A. (1985)] and calls the previous versions "the 1976 Act" [hereinafter U.L.PA.
(1976)] and "the 1916 Act" [hereinafter U.L.PA. (1916)].
The 1916 Act is used in eight jurisdictions: Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania,
Utah, Vermont, and the Virgin Islands. U.L.PA. (1916), 6 U.L.A. 172 (Supp. 1989).
The 1976 Act is used in seventeen states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See U.L.PA. (1976 & 1985), 6 U.L.A. 220-385 (Supp. 1989).
The 1985 Act is used in twenty-six jurisdictions: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. See id.
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I. WHOSE CONSENT Is NECESSARY TO REBUT A PRESUMPTION
OR MODIFY A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT?
Uniform Partnership Act
Nearly all the sections regarding the relationship among the part-
ners contain phrases such as "subject to any agreement between the part-
ners" or "unless otherwise agreed" 3 Thus, the U.RA. gives virtually com-
plete freedom of contract among the partners.
The U.RA. seems to divide partnership decisions into two categories:
ordinary and extraordinary. Unless otherwise agreed, ordinary decisions
need the approval of only the majority of the partners.5 Extraordinary
decisions presumably must be unanimous. The U.PA. does not give any
general test for deciding whether a particular decision is extraordinary.
But the U.RA. clearly indicates that certain decisions must be unanimous.
First, any act that, in a dispute with a non-partner, would not be bind-
ing on the partnership unless there is unanimous consent requires
unanimous consentO Second, any decision to make a partnership agree-
ment whose terms differ from those of the presumptions of the U.PA.
requires unanimous consent! Third, any "act in contravention of any
SU.RA. §§ 18-19, 37-38, 40, 42-43.
4 Riviera Congress Assoc. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.&2d 386 (1966);
Schwartz, Freedom of Contract among the Owners of a Partnership or Limited Partnership, 36 MERCER
L. REV. 701, 702-03 (1985).
1 Section 18:
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject
to any agreement between them, by the following rules ....
(e) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business.
(f) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership busines ....
(g) No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the
partners.
(h) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business
may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no act in contravention of any agree-




Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned the business, one or
more but less than all the partners have no authority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the assignee's promise
to pay the debts of the partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business
of a partnership,
(d) Confess a judgment,
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
U.P.A. § 9(3).
" Waite v. Salestrom, 206 Neb. 578, 294 N.W.2d 338 (1980); U.RA. § 18.
[VOL. 23:2
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agreement between the partners" requires unanimous consent8
The rule allowing ordinary decisions by majority rule can be modified
by unanimous agreement? Thus the partners can agree that some types
of ordinary matters require the approval of more than a mere majority.
Likewise, the rule requiring unanimous approval of extraordinary deci-
sions can be modified by a unanimous agreement.0 Thus the partners
can agree that some types of extraordinary matters need less than
unanimous approval.
Although the requirement of unanimity can be waived, one court has
challenged the validity of a general waiver of any further need for
unanimity. In McCallum v. Ashbury"I the court stated that fundamental
changes in a partnership agreement cannot be made without the con-
sent of all partners, even if the agreement provides that it can be amended
by majority rule. This statement is dictum, however, as the court held
that the change in the partnership agreement was not fundamental. 2
But another court has upheld the validity of a general waiver of any
further need for unanimity. In Aztec Petroleum Corp v. MHM Ca, the
court held that an agreement allowing amendments to the partnership
agreement with merely 70% approval is binding even regarding fun-
damental change 3
Regarding "acts in contravention of any agreement between the part-
ners," it is not clear whether "any agreement" refers to any decision made
unanimously. Is unanimity required to change (1) an ordinary decision
that happened to be made unanimously or (2) a unanimous decision to
deviate from the presumptions of the U.PA.?
SU.PA. § 18(h).
9 U.PA. § 18(h).
" Waite v. Salestrom, 206 Neb. 578, 294 N.W.2d 338 (1980); Aztec Petroleum Corp. v. MHM Co.,
703 SW.2d 290 (Tex Ct. App. 1985); UPRA. 99 9(3), 18. But see infra text accompanying notes 11-13.
See generally, Comment, U PA Section 18(h): Majority Contro4 Dissenting Partner, and the Need
for Reform, 13 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 903 (1980).
" 238 Or. 257, 393 P2d 774 (1964).
"2 The court's presentation of the facts and issues of this case is confusing. The case involved
a partnership of ten doctors. One clause in the partnership agreement allowed a majority to expel
a partner. Another clause prohibited competition for ten years within thirty miles. The case is unclear
on whether the covenant not to compete applied only to a partner who withdrew or also to one who
was expelled. Furthermore, it is unclear on whether the plaintiff withdrew, was expelled, or was
seeking dissolution under U.PA. section 32. The court's statement on the need for unanimity does
not arise in a discussion of these issues, however. Rather, it concerns a decision by the majority creating
an executive committee to manage the partnership.
1s 703 &W.2d 290 (Tex Ct. App. 1985). Although this case involves a limited partnership, the
rules on unanimous consent are similar to those for an ordinary partnership. See U.L.P.A. §§ 9,
29 (1916) (under which this case was decided); U.L.PA. §§ 403, 1105 (1976 & 1985).
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In several cases courts have stated that unanimity is not required
to change a previous unanimous agreement in some circumstances. In
Cotton Plant Oil Mill Ca v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Ca 14 a pre-U.RA. case,
Pearce and five other persons formed a partnership. By unanimous agree-
ment the partners gave Pearce exclusive authority to buy and sell cot-
ton seed. In violation of this agreement, four of the other five partners
made a contract, on behalf of the partnership, selling cotton seed to the
plaintiff. Although the plaintiff knew that the partners had given Pearce
exclusive authority, the plaintiff was allowed to enforce the contract. The
court held that delegation of exclusive agency power to one partner was
revocable by a majority of the partners.!5
In Glassell v. Prentiss6 the plaintiff and the four defendants formed
a partnership. The partners made a unanimous agreement that the plain-
tiff would be the field superintendent, with a salary of $200 a week. 7
The four defendants later decided to terminate the plaintiff's position,
dissolve the partnership, and liquidate the assets' In an action for an
accounting, the court gave two reasons for rejecting the plaintiff's claim
for loss of the salary. First, dissolution terminates the plaintiff's right
to the salary.'9 Second, even if there were no dissolution, the plaintiff's
position and salary were revocable by the majority of the partners because
the decision to create the position and salary was an ordinary decision2
The court's second explanation, which perhaps is dictum, is clearly
wrong. The U.P.A. creates a presumption that each partner has an equal
right in the management and conduct of the business!' Therefore, the
delegation of exclusive authority to the plaintiff (like the granting of ex-
clusive authority to Pearce in Cotton Plant Oil) was an extraordinary deci-
sion and requires unanimous consent0 The U.RA. also creates a presump-
tion that no partner is entitled to any compensation for services!'
Therefore, the granting of a salary to the plaintiff likewise was an ex-
traordinary decision and requires unanimous consent.
14 192 Ark. 271, 122 S.W. 658 (1909).
The fact that this case involved a suit between a third person and a partnership is not impor-
tant, because the validity of the plaintiff's claim depended on whether the majority had the right
to revoke Pearce's exclusive authority. "No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authori-
ty shall bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction." U.P.A. § 9(4).
16 175 Cal. App. 2d 599, 346 P.2d 895 (1959).
1, Id. at 601, 346 P.2d at 898.
I8 Jd.
9 Id. at 609, 346 P.2d at 903.
20 Id.
" U.P.A. § 18(e).
" See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
SU.P.A. § 18(). See generally, Schwartz, Compensation of a Partner for Services: Problems in
Interpreting the UPA and Partnership Agreements, 18 Sw. U.L. REv. __ (1990).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
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In Rosenfeld u Rosenfeld" the plaintiff and the four defendants formed
a partnership2 5 The partners made a unanimous agreement regarding
the salary of each partner?6 When the defendants wanted an increase
in their salaries, the plaintiff originally consented, but later objected27
The court held that each partner has the power to terminate the salary
agreement 8
In Horn v. Builders Supply Ca 29 Horn was one of two general part-
ners in a limited partnership.3 ° By unanimous agreement Horn received
a $700 salary and a $100 expense account a month?1 Later, all the part-
ners except Horn voted to fire Horn and eliminate Horn's salary and ex-
pense account?2 In an action for dissolution and an accounting, the court
denied Horn's claim for loss of salary?3 The court stated that unanimous
consent is not necessary to terminate the salary of a partner? This state-
ment perhaps is dictum, because unanimous consent is not necessary to
dissolve a limited partnership and a partner's salary generally terminates
upon dissolution. 5
These cases assert (although often only in dicta) that unanimity is
not required to cancel a deviation from the presumptions created by the
U.RA. This view is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the U.P.A
3 6
Furthermore, this view is unfair to any partner who detrimentally relied
on the terms of the partnership agreement. 7 Thus courts generally have
supported the better view that unanimous consent is needed to modify
a partnership agreement?8
- 390 Pa. 39, 133 A.2d 829 (1957).
2 Id. at 42, 133 A.2d at 830.
" Id. at 43-44, 133 A.2d at 831.
Id., 133 A.2d at 831-32.
U Id. at 49, 133 A.2d at 834.
401 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
Although this case involves a limited partnership, the rules on unanimous consent are similar
to those for an ordinary partnership. See U.L.RA. §§ 9, 29 (1916) (under which this case was de-
cided); U.L.P.A. §§ 403, 1105 (1976 & 1985).
" Horn v. Builders Supply Co., 401 S.W.2d at 145.
32 Id.
" Id. at 149.
" Id. at 148.
3 Glassell v. Prentiss, 175 Cal. App.2d 599, 346 P.2d 895 (1959). See U.P.A. §§ 18, 29, 31, 32;
U.L.P.A. §§ 9, 20, 29 (1916); U.L.P.A. §§ 403, 801, 1105 (1976 & 1985). But see Tucker v. Tucker,
370 Pa. 8, 87 A.2d 650 (1952) (express salary continues after dissolution as compensation for wind-
ing up).
"[ N~o act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without
the consent of all the partners." U.P.A. § 18(h).
" See Schwartz, supra note 23.
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Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916)
The 1916 Act often is unclear on whether a provision refers only to
disputes among the members,3 9 only to disputes between the partnership
and a non-partner, or to both types of disputes0 The 1916 Act also is
unclear on whether a provision merely creates a presumption 1 Regard-
ing disputes among the members, some courts have held that there is
virtually complete freedom of contract: 2
To create a limited partnership, the members must file a certificate
of limited partnership with a state government.' 3 Under the 1916 Act,
the certificate must contain much information about the partnership.
' Waite v. Salestrom, 206 Neb. 578,294 N.W.2d 338 (1980); Ben-Dashan v. Plitt, 58 A.D.2d 244,
396 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1977). This is in accord with pre-U.PA. case law. See Gage v. Parmelee, 87 Ill.
329 (1877); Keiley v. Turner, 81 Md. 269, 31 A. 700 (1895).
'9 In the 1916 Act the owners of a limited partnership are called "general partners," "limited
partners," or, collectively, "members." But they are not called "partners." Under the 1916 Act, "[tihe
person who contributes the capital, though in accordance with custom called a limited partner, is
not in any sense a partner. He is, however, a member of the association." U.L.RA. § 1 comment (1916),
6 U.L.A. 564 (1969). See also Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1917).
40 Schwartz, supra note 4, at 703.
41 Id.
Riviera Congress Assoc- v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966);
Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939).
43 U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
" Section 2(1):
Two or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall:
(a) Sign and swear to a certificate, which shall state
I. The name of the partnership,
II. The character of the business,
III. The location of the principal place of business,
IV. The name and place of residence of each member; general and limited partners
being respectively designated,
V. The term for which the partnership is to exist,
VI. The amount of cash and a description of and the agreed value of the other property
contributed by each limited partner,
VII. The additional contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner
and the times at which or events on the happening of which they shall be made,
VIII. The time, if agreed upon, when the contribution of each limited partner is to be
returned,
IX. The share of the profits or the other compensation by way of income which each
limited partner shall receive by reason of his contribution,
X. The right, if given, of a limited partner to substitute an assignee as contributor
in his place, and the terms and conditions of the substitution,
XI. The right, if given, of the partners to admit additional limited partners,
XII. The right, if given, of one or more of the limited partners to priority over other
limited partners, as to contributions or as compensation by way of income, and the
nature of such priority,
XIII. The right, if given, of the remaining general partner or partners to continue the
business on the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner, and
XIV. The right, if given, of a limited partner to demand and receive property other
than cash in return for his contribution.
U.L.P.A. § 2(1) (1916).
[VoL. 23:2
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DISPUTES AMONG PARTNERS
The 1916 Act explicitly requires the unanimous consent of the
members to amend the certificate" or to do anything inconsistent with
the certificate4 7 Unanimous consent is also necessary (1) to possess part-
nership property for other than partnership purposes, (2) to continue the
business after the death, retirement, or insanity of a general partner,
and (3) for some acts involving non-partners that would not be binding
unless there is unanimous consent.' s The need for unanimous consent
is subject to contrary agreement among the members.'9 But for all other
types of decisions, the general partners have the power to do anything
that the partners in an ordinary partnership can do, except as provided
by the certificate.5 ° Thus, the general partners can, by unanimous con-
sent, change other aspects of the partnership agreement, unless the cer-
tificate restricts the power of the general partners' l
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976)
The 1976 Act eliminated much of the confusion of the 1916 Act' 2 Near-
ly all the sections regarding the relationship among the partners5 3 con-
tain phrases such as "unless otherwise provided in the partnership agree-
ment."5 Thus, the 1976 Act gives virtually complete freedom to contract
" U.L.PA. prefatory note (1985), 6 U.L.A. 221-23 (Supp. 1989); Schwartz, The Uniform Limited
Partnership Act Are the Recent Changes Improvements? 93 DICK. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (1989).
" U.L.PA. § 24-25 (1916).
41 Section 9(1):
A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and
liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners, except that without the written
consent or ratification of the specific act by all the limited partners, a general partner or all of
the general partners have no authority to
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate,
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of
the partnership,
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership,
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific property, for other
than a partnership purpose,
(e) Admit a person as a general partner,
(f) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right to do so is given in the certificate,
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, retirement or in-
sanity of a general partner, unless the right to do so is given in the certificate.
U.L.P.A. § 9(1) (1916).
48 Id. Compare with U.P.A. §§ 9(3), 18(g).
4' Aztec Petroleum Corp. v. MHM Co., 703 S.W.2d 290 (Tex Ct. App. 1985).
See U.L.P.A. §§ 2, 9, 24 (1916).
"See id. But the power of the general partners is subject to the duty of good faith. Bassan v.
Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974).
"Schwartz, supra note 4, at 708.
In the 1976 Act the owners of a limited partnership are called "partners" rather than "members,'
as in the 1916 Act. This change apparently is not merely a change in terminology, but involves
an abandonment of the view that a limited partner "is not in any sense a partner." See supra note 39.
U.L.PA. 88 107, 301-02, 403-05, 502-04, 601-05, 702, 803-04 (1976).
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among the partners 5
The 1976 Act explicitly requires the unanimous consent of the part-
ners to add a new general partnerys Also, contributions to be made by
a limited partner cannot be increased without the consent of that part-
ner 7 But for all other types of decisions, the general partners have the
power to do anything that the partners in an ordinary partnership can
do, except as provided by the partnership agreement 8 Thus, the general
partners can by unanimous consent change other aspects of the partner-
ship agreement, unless the partnership agreement restricts the power
of the general partners.59
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985)
The 1985 Act made few changes regarding the presumptions on the
mutual rights and duties of the partners50 ° The 1985 Act generally re-
quires the unanimous consent of the partners to add a new general part-
nerP1 But for all other types of decisions, the 1985 Act gives the general
partners the power to do anything that the partners in an ordinary part-
nership can do, except as provided by the partnership agreement!2 Thus,
the general partners can by unanimous consent change other aspects of
the partnership agreement, unless the partnership agreement restricts
the power of the general partners!3
II. WHAT EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT To REBUT A PRESUMPTION
OR MODIFY A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT?
Uniform Partnership Act
To rebut a U.PA. presumption on the mutual rights and duties of the
partners, must there be evidence of a written agreement or even an ex-
press oral agreement? The U.PA. does not expressly discuss this issue.
11 But the right of each limited partner to "reasonable" access to information about the partner-
ship perhaps is absolute. U.L.RA. § 305 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 709.
U.L.RA. § 401 (1976).
" U.L.RA. § 204(aX2) (1976).
"Except as provided in this Act or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions and liabilities of a partner
in a partnership without limited partners." U.L.RA. § 403 (1976 & 1985).
" Id. But the power of the general partners is subject to a duty of good faith. Jerman v. O'Leary,
145 Ariz. 397, 701 P.2d 1205 (1985); Mahon v. Harst, 738 P.2d 1190 (Colo. App. 1987); Roeschlein
v. Watkins, 686 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1983); Ebest v. Bruce, 734 SW2d 915 (Mo. App. 1987).
' Schwartz, supra note 45.
61 U.L.P.A. § 401 (1985).
62 U.L.RA. § 403 (1976 & 1985).
"Id. But the power of the general partners is subject to a duty of good faith. See supra note 59.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
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DISPUTES AMONG PARTNERS
But the U.PA. does incorporate by reference the general rules of contract
law.4
The general rules of contract law do not require evidence of a writ-
ten agreement unless the contract is covered by the Statute of Frauds0 5
Furthermore, a presumption can be rebutted not only by express terms,
but also by terms that are implied by conduct and usages. 6
Prior to the U.PA., case law followed general contract law, and
presumptions were readily rebutted, not only by express oral agreements,
but also by agreements implied by conduct. 7 And an express agreement
could be rebutted by conduct and usages s Likewise, under the U.PA.,
presumptions often were rebutted, not only by express oral agreements,
but also by agreements implied by conduct 9 Also, express agreements
often were rebutted by conduct and usages 0
But some courts require an express agreement to rebut a presump-
tion of the U.P.A. For example, several courts have held that an express
agreement is required to rebut the presumptions (1) that no partner is
entitled to compensation for services, 1 (2) that each partner has an equal
right to participate in partnership affairs, 2 and (3) that profits are di-
vided equally 3
" U.PA. § 5.
" See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1979).
Id §§ 202, 203, 219-23 (1979).
61 E.g, Dugan v. Forster, 104 Cal. App. 117, 285 P. 384 (1930) (salary implied by course of perfor-
mance); Lewis v. Moffett, 11 Ill. 392 (1849) (salary implied by course of performance); Gallivan v.
O'Donnell, 54 R.I. 194, 171 A. 911 (1934) (salary implied by course of performance); Montgomery
v. Burch, 11 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Schwartz, supra note 23.
"Gage v. Parmelee, 87 Ill. 329 (1877) (express agreement on a salary rebutted by course of per-
formance); Keiley v. Turner, 81 Md. 269, 31 A. 700 (1895) (express agreement on a salary rebutted
by course of performance).
19 E.g, Van Ruiten v. Van Ruiten, 268 Cal. App. 2d 619,74 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1969) (oral agreement
on a salary); Knauss v. Hale, 64 Idaho 218, 131 P.2d 292 (1942) (implied agreement on salary); Flan-
nery v. Flannery, 320 Ill. App. 421, 51 N.E.2d 349 (1943) (implied agreement on share of profits);
Petersen v. Petersen, 284 Minn. 61, 169 N.W.2d 228 (1969) (implied agreement on settlement of ac-
counts upon dissolution); Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 365 N.W.2d 816 (1985) (implied agreement
on share of profits); Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207 (1958) (im-
plied agreement on salary).
" Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184, 16 N.E.2d 644 (1938) (express agreement on salary rebut-
ted by course of performance); Ben-Dashan v. Plitt, 58 A.D.2d 244, 396 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1977) (express
agreement on compensation rebutted by course of performance); Harding v. Haas, 428 P.2d 390 (Wyo.
1967) (express agreement on share of profits rebutted by course of performance).
7 Yoder v. Hooper 695 P2d 1182, 1186 (Cola Appl 1984) ("Absent an express agreement, no partner
may take a salary for partnership business.'); Barthuly v. Barthuly, 192 Neb. 610, 223 N.W.2d 429,
432 (1974) ("A partner is not entitled to charge the partnership account for his services unless there
is an express agreement that he shall be compensated for such services."); Cohen v. Erdle, 282 A.D.
569, 126 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1953); Baker v. McGrane, 198 Wis. 512, 224 NW. 737 (1929); Schwartz, supra
note 23.
" Covalt v. High, 100 N.M. 700, 675 P.2d 999, 1002 (1983) ("Except where the partners express-
ly agree to the contrary... all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the
business of the partnership.").
"' Presutti v. Presutti, 270 Md. 193, 310 A.2d 791 (1973).
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Furthermore, one court has stated, in dictum, that the rebuttal of a
presumption sometimes requires written evidence. In Jensen v. Schreck,74
a farm was owned by the Schreck brothers and Randolph. The Schreck
brothers provided the labor and Randolph provided the land and most
of the machinery, livestock, and financial capital. A dispute arose on
whether Randolph was entitled to receive interest on his contributions.
The court, in enforcing a written agreement that Randolph would receive
interest, stated that written evidence generally is required to rebut the
presumption of no interest on contributions.!
Some courts, although not actually requiring written evidence, merely
give lip service to arguments based on express oral arguments. For ex-
ample, in Wind u Herbert6 the general partners of a limited partner-
ship paid themselves a salary. In an action ancillary to an accounting,
the limited partners sought a preliminary injunction to stop the receipt
of the salary. Despite the uncontroverted evidence that there was an oral
agreement to pay the salary to the general partners, the court allowed
the injunction7
The view requiring written evidence, or even an express oral agree-
ment, is inconsistent with the provisions of the U.RA. and has been re-
jected by most case law.8 Furthermore, this view is unfair to any partner
who detrimentally relied on an express oral agreement or an agreement
implied by conduct.
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916)
Rebuttal of some of the presumptions of the 1916 Act seems to re-
quire certain formalities: either a statement in the certificate or specific
consent (which sometimes must be written). The presumptions on the
limitation of the powers of a general partner can rebutted only by writ-
ten consent of the limited partners to a specific act or, sometimes, by a
statement in the certificate79 The presumption that all limited partners
have equal rights can be rebutted only by a statement in the certifi-
cate!' The presumption that the return of a limited partner's contribution
"' 275 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1979).
" "The general rule is that interest on contributions of partnership assets is not allowed in the
absence of a written agreement to the contrary, until a 'balance has been struck: but that interest
may be charged in a particular case if the equities require." Id. at 380.
7186 Cal. App. 2d 276, 8 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1960).
" Although this case involves a limited partnership, the rules on rebuttal of the presumption
of no compensation for services are the same as those for an ordinary partnership. See U.L.PA. §§
9, 29 (1916) (under which this case was decided); U.L.PA. §§ 403 & 1105 (1976 & 1985).
78 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
79 U.L.A. § 9 (1916).
8 U.L.A. § 14 (1916).
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will be made only in cash can be rebutted only by a statement in the
certificate or by the specific consent of all members l
The presumption that a limited partner is liable to the partnership
for unpaid contributions can be rebutted only by the specific consent of
all members?2 The presumption that an assignee of a limited partner-
ship interest has no right to become a substituted limited partner can
be rebutted only by a statement in the certificate or by the specific con-
sent of all members (except the assignor),3 The presumption that, after
the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner, the remaining
general partners have no right to continue the business, can be rebutted
by a statement in the certificate or by the specific consent of all members.
Also, the presumptions on settling accounts after dissolution can be rebut-
ted only by a statement in the certificate or by the specific consent of
all members!5
Despite the absolute language of the 1916 Act, some courts have held
that the specified formalities need not always be followed? 6 But other
courts have held that the formalities must be followed?'
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976)
The 1976 Act greatly reduced the formalities for rebutting presump-
tions. But the addition of a general partner requires the specific written
8' U.L.RA. § 16(3) (1916).
82 U.L.PA. § 17(3) (1916).
" U.L.PA. § 19(4) (1916).
" U.L.PA. § 20 (1916).
a' U.L.PA. § 23(2) (1916).
In Wasserman v. Wasserman, 7 Mass. App Ct. 167, 386 N.E.2d 783 (1979), the certificate allowed
the general partner to choose a new general partner without the consent of the limited partners.
The general partner assigned his general partnership rights to the plaintiff. The court held that
the plaintiff was the sole general partner, although the limited partners did not give specific con-
sent as seemingly required by U.L.PA. section 9(lXe) (1916). Id. at 175, 386 N.E.2d at 788-89.
In Mist Properties, Inc. v. Fitzsimmons Realty Ca, 228 N.Y.S2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), an agree-
ment among the members gave the general partners broad discretion to sell partnership property.
In a dispute with a mortgagee, indirectly involving a sale that did not conform with the formalities
of U.L.P.A. section 9 (1916), the court said that the agreement among the members was binding
on them. Id. at 410.
" In Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (SD.N.Y. 1973), rev'd in part, 563 F.2d
1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S 1035 (1978), the court stated that the requirement of con-
sent to a specific act, under U.L.PA. section 9(lXa)-(e) (1916), cannot be waived by a provision in
the certificate. This statement is dictum, however, since the certificate did not waive the require-
ment of specific consent.
In Williams v. Cottonwood Cove Dev. Co., 96 Nev. 857,619 P.2d 1219 (1980), the general partner
signed an agreement for the sale of substantially all assets of the partnership to the plaintiff. The
court held that the buyer could not enforce the agreement, because the limited partners did not
either give written consent or ratification, as required by U.L.PA. section 9 (1916).
See generally Schwartz, supra note 4, at 707-08.
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consent of all partners!' The presumptions on events that terminate a
person's status as a general partner can be rebutted only by the specific
written consent of all partners or, sometimes, by a statement in the cer-
tificate! 9 Also, the presumption that a partner has a right to demand a
distribution only in cash can be rebutted only by a statement in the cer-
tificate.0
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985)
The 1985 Act made a few changes in the formalities for decisions
among the partners. A new general partner can be admitted as provided
by a written partnership agreement or with the written consent of all
partners?1 The presumptions on events that terminate a person's status
as a general partner can be rebutted only by the specific written consent
of all partners or, sometimes, by a written partnership agreement?2 And
the presumptions on distributions in kind can be rebutted only by a writ-
ten partnership agreement?
3
88 "After the filing of a limited partnership's original certificate of limited partnership, addi-
tional general partners may be admitted only with the specific written consent of each partner."
U.L.P.A. § 401 (1976).
89 U.L.A. § 402 (1976).
'Section 605:
Except as provided in the certificate of limited partnership, a partner, regardless of
the nature of his contribution, has no right to demand and receive any distribution
from a limited partnership in any form other than cash. Except as provided in the part-
nership agreement, a partner may not be compelled to accept a distribution of any asset
in kind from a limited partnership to the extent that the percentage of the asset
distributed to him exceeds a percentage of that asset which is equal to the percentage
in which he shares in distributions from the limited partnership.
U.L.TA. § 605 (1976).
91 Section 401:
After the filing of a limited partnership's original certificate of limited partnership,
additional general partners may be admitted as provided in writing in the partner-
ship agreement or, if the partnership agreement does not provide in writing for the
admission of additional general partners, with the written consent of all partners.
U.L.PA. § 401 (1985).
92 U.L.PA. § 402 (1985).
9 Section 605:
Except as provided in writing in the partnership agreement, a partner, regardless of
the nature of his contribution, has no right to demand and receive any distribution
from a limited partnership in any form other than cash. Except as provided in writing
in the partnership agreement, a partner may not be compelled to accept a distribution
of any asset in kind from a limited partnership to the extent that the percentage of
the asset distributed to him exceeds a percentage of that asset which is equal to the
percentage in which he shares in distributions from the limited partnership.
U.L.P.A. § 605 (1985).
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Unanimous consent of the partners is required to rebut a presump-
tion of the U.PA. or modify a partnership agreement! 4 But a few cases
assert that unanimity is not required to cancel a deviation from the
presumptions of the U.RA?5 This view is inconsistent with the U.RA. and
has been rejected by most case law! 6 Furthermore, this view is unfair to
any partner who detrimentally relied on the terms of the partnership
agreement. Although dissolution provides a remedy to a dissatisfied part-
ner, the burden of seeking this harsh remedy should be on the partners
who want to breach the agreement, not on the partner who is a victim
of the breach.
Evidence based on conduct or usages is sufficient to rebut a presump-
tion of the U.RA. or modify a partnership agreement? 7 But a few cases
assert that rebuttal of a presumption of the U.RA. requires an express
agreement, which sometimes must be written?' This view is inconsis-
tent with the U.RA. and has been rejected by most case law?9 Further-
more, this view is unfair to any partner who detrimentally relied on an
express oral agreement or an agreement implied by conduct or usages.
Uniform Limited Partnership Acts
To rebut a presumption of the U.L.RA. or modify a partnership agree-
ment always requires the unanimous consent of the general partners and
generally requires the unanimous consent of the limited partners. 0 But
rebuttal of some of the presumptions seems to require certain formalities:
a statement in the certificate, a written partnership agreement, or specific
consent.0 1 The 1976 Act greatly reduced the formalities for rebutting
presumptions.!0 2 The 1985 Act eliminated the need for statements in
the certificate.0 3 These changes are desireable, since they reduce the ex-
pense and inconvenience of modifying a limited partnership and increase
the flexibility of limited partnerships.!0 4
"See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
® See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
103 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 568-70. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
'0 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 568-70.
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